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Abstract
The relation between the ECB’s main reﬁnancing (MRO) rates and the money market is key
for the monetary transmission process in the euro area. This paper investigates how money
market rates respond to the new information revealed by MRO auctions. Our results conﬁrm
a stabilizing level relationship between the overnight rate Eonia and MRO rates before the
ﬁnancial crisis. Since the start of the ﬁnancial crisis, however, we ﬁnd that MRO auction out-
comes even exacerbated the disconnection of money market rates from the policy-intended
interest rate level. These ﬁndings support the ﬁxed rate full allotment policy introduced by
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Weekly main reﬁnancing operations (MROs) are of overwhelming importance for the monetary
policy implementation of the European Central Bank (ECB). The liquidity supply in MROs should
ensure that short-term money market rates closely follow the MRO rates and that their volatility
remains well contained, see e.g. Cassola and Morana (2008) and Ejerskov et al. (2008). This cen-
tral aim of monetary policy implementation has never been an easy task. Even before the ﬁnancial
crisis, a puzzling and unintended upward trend in the spread between the European overnight rate
(Eonia) and the MRO rates indicated that the monetary transmission mechanism is not sufﬁciently
understood, see Linzert and Schmidt (2010).1 Since the start of the ﬁnancial crisis, spreads be-
tween the ECB’s main reﬁnancing rates and the money market rates have been huge and persistent.
In order to shed more light on the very beginning of the monetary transmission process in the euro
area, this paper investigates how the European money market responds to MRO auction outcomes.
On the allotment day, the ECB publishes the number of bidders, total allotment and total bids
together with the marginal and the weighted average allotment rate of the MRO.All these variables
may contain new information about the expected course of monetary policy and the situation in the
money market. This paper assesses the role of MROsfor the monetary transmission mechanism by
estimating the response of money market rates to the various aspects of a MRO auction outcome.
Our study can be related to two groups of papers. First, there is a growing empirical literature
on the dynamics and the volatility of overnight rates. Recent examples include Bartolini and Prati
(2006), P´ erez Quir´ os and Rodr´ ıguez Mendiz´ abal (2006), Colarossi and Zaghini (2009), and Nautz
and Scheithauer (2009). All these contributions investigate how distinguishing features of the
central bank’s operational framework inﬂuence the behavior of overnight rates. They do not focus
on the response of the overnight rate to auction outcomes. The second group of papers explores
banks’ bidding behavior in central bank auctions, see e.g. Linzert et al. (2007), Bindseil et al.
(2009), and Cassola et al. (2009). Using individual bidding data, it can be shown that money
market conditions signiﬁcantly affect banks’ bidding behavior. These papers try to explain the
auction outcome but do not consider its repercussions on the money market.
The current paper ﬁlls this gap and explores the impact of the ECB’s MRO auctions on short-
1In contrast to earlier estimates of the liquidity eﬀect, even the ECB’s provision of massive excess
liquidity in MROs could not bring the Eonia back to its intended level, see European Central Bank (2006).
In the U.S. the empirical relevance of the liquidity eﬀect has been analyzed by e.g. Carpenter and Demiralp
(2008) and Thornton (2008).
1term money market rates in the euro area using both daily and intra-day data of overnight rates.
Longer-term Eonia swap rates are employed to examine how the auctions affect market’s expecta-
tions about future Eonia movements. Our results show that the recent crisis signiﬁcantly impeded
the ﬁrst step of the monetary transmission mechanism. Before the ﬁnancial crisis, MRO auction
outcomes helped to stabilize the money market. If e.g. the spread between the Eonia and the new
MRO rate was above average, the Eonia would adjust accordingly. Since the outbreak of the crisis,
however, the stabilizing effect of MRO auctions on the Eonia level has disappeared. In contrast,
MRO auction outcomes distorted by safety bids exacerbated the disconnection of money market
rates from the policy-intended interest rate level. Therefore, our results provide strong support for
the ECB’s decision to re-stabilize banks’ reﬁnancing conditions by introducing a ﬁxed rate full
allotment policy for the whole maturity spectrum of its reﬁnancing operations as of October 2008.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy review the role of
MRO auctions in the operational framework of the ECB and consider the timing of the auctions.
Section 3 introduces the auction variables and discusses their expected inﬂuence on the money
market. Section 4 presents the empirical results on the impact of MRO auction outcomes on
money market rates before and during the crisis. Section 5 summarizes our main results and offers
some concluding remarks on the choice of MRO auction formats for the post-crisis period.
2 The Role of MRO Auctions in the ECB’s Operational
Framework
2.1 Monetary Policy Implementation
The ECB implements its monetary policy through a framework in which the banking sector op-
erates in a liquidity deﬁcit vis-´ a-vis the Eurosystem. The weekly main reﬁnancing operations
(MROs) cover the bulk of banks’ liquidity demand and play the pivotal role in signalling the mon-
etary policy stance. From June 2000 until October 2008, MROs were conducted as variable rate
tenders, i.e. as price-discriminatory multi-unit auctions where banks are allowed to submit multi-
ple price-quantity bids. In variable rate tenders the resulting repo rates partially depend on the bids
of the banks and, thus, are not under the ECB’s full control. Therefore, the ECB pre-announces a
minimum bid rate. The interest rates actually applied in the MROs can be viewed as the ﬁrst step
in the transmission of monetary policy and should determine the level of short-term interest rates
in the euro area’s money market.
Unlike the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, the ECB has never announced an explicit operational
2target for its monetary policy implementation, see e.g. Ho (2008). However, there is no doubt
that the ECB’s liquidity policy aims at stabilizing the shortest money market rate, Eonia, to a level
close to its main reﬁnancing rates, see e.g. Cassola and Morana (2008) and Ejerskov et al. (2008).
Figure 1 shows the corridor in which the Eonia ﬂuctuates between the two standing facilities and
the minimum bid rate as its mid-point.
Figure 1: The interest rate corridor of the ECB
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Notes: The light shaded area refers to the crisis period as of August 9, 2007. The
dashed vertical line represents the ECB’s adoption of the ﬁxed rate tender procedure
with full allotment as of October 15, 2008.
On August 9, 2007 tensions surrounding assets backed by US sub-prime mortgages started
to spill over into money markets around the world, leading to liquidity shortages in the money
market. In the euro area, the overnight rate rose substantially following an increased liquidity
demand in the overnight market. As a consequence, the ECB increased the amount of liquidity in
its weekly MROs signiﬁcantly. In order to account for the changes in the demand and supply of
liquidity in the ECB’s MROs, we allow money markets to respond differently to auction results
after August 2007. Therefore, we explore the link between the Eonia and MROs for the crisis and
pre-crisis sample separately. In fact, splitting our sample on August 9, 2007 is also implied by
structural breakpoint tests, see Section B in the Appendix.
After Lehman Brothers ﬁled for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the crisis intensiﬁed.
Banks became even more reluctant to engage in interbank money market trading and relied to
an increasing extent on the ECB’s reﬁnancing operations, see e.g. Hauck and Neyer (2010). On
October 15, 2008 the ECB responded to the exacerbated crisis and switched from the variable rate
tender format to a ﬁxed rate full allotment policy, hence satisfying the full liquidity demand of the
3banking sector.2 The information content of an auction outcome is very limited under this format:
In a ﬁxed rate tender, the repo rate is pre-announced and all MRO rates are equal by construction.
Moreover, due to full allotment, the cover-to-bid ratio is always one. Therefore, in the following
empirical analysis on the information content of MROs, we shall focus on the variable rate tender
period. Yet, our results may shed light on the rationale behind the ECB’s switch to the ﬁxed rate
full allotment tender format.
2.2 Measuring the Money Market Response to an MRO Auction Out-
come
In the MROs of the ECB, banks are invited to submit their bids from Monday 3:30 p.m. CET
to Tuesday 9:30 a.m. CET. At Tuesday 11:20 a.m. CET, the ECB communicates the auction
outcome via its wire service. The response of the money market to an auction outcome should
be reﬂected in overnight rates observed immediately after the auction results are available. Let ib
and ia be the market rates valid before and after banks are informed about the auction outcomes.
The money market response to the auction is then revealed in ∆i = ia − ib. We measure ∆i in
three ways and thereby cover three main trading segments of the money market. First, in line with
the empirical literature, we use daily data of the Eonia, the European Over-Night Index Average
published by the ECB.3 Eonia rates refer to transactions carried out before the closing of real-
time gross settlement (RTGS) system at 6.00 p.m. CET and are published on the same evening.
Since the bulk of money market transactions are carried out after the auction result is announced,
the timing of MROs suggests to use Eonia rates of Monday (ib) and Tuesday (ia) to measure the
money market reaction to an auction outcome.
If money markets react quickly to new information about the liquidity situation, the average
overnight rate at the auction day might be only a poor approximation for ia and similar problems
may apply to ib. Therefore, in a second speciﬁcation of ∆i, we use intra-day broker quotes col-
lected from Reuters at 9:30 a.m. CET and 11:25 a.m. CET for ib and ia, respectively. These rates
are very close to the end of bid submission and the announcement of the auction outcome. Yet
the available intra-day data bears two shortcomings. Firstly, intra-day data cover only that part
2On March 4, 2010 the ECB announced that the full allotment policy for MROs will be applied at least
until October 2010, see ECB’s press release webpage. For further explanations, refer to European Central
Bank (2010).
3The Eonia is based on a panel of approx. 50 banks with the highest business volume in the euro
area money market, see http://www.euribor.org. Following European Central Bank (2007), the unsecured
market remains mainly an overnight market segment, with roughly 70% of the volumes both in the lending
and borrowing activities in the shortest maturity bucket.
4of the ’over the counter’ (OTC) market trading that is processed through voice brokers. 4 Thus,
transactions between banks directly are missing. And secondly, in contrast to the daily Eonia data,
intra-day data only refer to unbinding quotes rather than actual transactions.
A third approximation of ∆i uses daily data of Eonia swap rates with one-week maturity
obtained from Reuters. The Eonia swap market, in general, serves as the main instrument to
manage short-term interest risk exposures and covers roughly 40% of the overall OTC derivatives
market, see e.g. European Central Bank (2007). The one-week swap rate corresponds to the
maturity of the MROs and measures the expected average Eonia over the next week. Thus, it is
less affected by outliers than the daily Eonia. Because MROs are conducted only once a week,
the one-week Eonia swap rate cannot be affected by expectations about future auction outcomes
at an auction day. Since March 2008, the announcement of Eonia swap rates has changed from
4:30 p.m. CET to 11 a.m. CET. In line with the timing of MROs, the deﬁnition of ∆i is adjusted
accordingly.
Starting with the ﬁrst price-discriminatory multi-unit auction on June 27, 2000 we have col-
lected 434 auctions until October 14, 2008. The intra-day data is only available for December 4,
2000 to June 17, 2008. For the sake of comparability, we will run all our regressions from De-
cember 4, 2000 to June 17, 2008. At the end of the reserve maintenance period, when no further
MRO will be conducted, liquidity shortages or excess reserves can lead to dramatic increases of
overnight rate volatility. It is well understood by the market that these seasonal interest rate ﬂuc-
tuations are temporary and unrelated to monetary policy signals, see e.g. Nautz and Offermanns
(2008). To ensure that our results will not depend on the large Eonia movements at the very last
day of the reserve period, we excluded the auctions performed at those particular days from our
regressions.5 After these sample adjustments, we are left with 282 and 33 auctions before and
during the crisis, respectively.
4According to European Central Bank (2007), more than 90% of all interbank transactions in the OTC
derivatives market (other than foreign exchange swaps) are traded directly or through voice brokers. Since
data on bilateral trading is notoriously hard to obtain, we use transactions through voice brokers that
account for 27% of the total turnover in OTC derivatives.
5For the sake of robustness, two further observations were identiﬁed as outliers: the MRO with anoma-
lous allotment one week after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 and the MRO distorted by the
announcement of the six-month supplementary operation in April 2008.
53 The MRO Auction Outcomes: Variables and Predictions
On the allotment day, the ECB publishes (i) the marginal rate (rm) of the MRO, (ii) the quantity
weighted average rate (rw) of all successful bids, (iii) total bids and total allotments, and (iv) the
number of bidders. All these variables may contain new information about the situation in the
money market and the policy-intended interest rate level.
The marginal rate or stop-out rate of a MRO, rm, depends on both, banks’ bidding behavior
and the ECB’s allotment decision. In any case, deviations of the marginal rate from the overnight
rate valid immediately before the auction, rm − ib, should imply that the overnight rate ia adjusts
accordingly. In an error-correction type adjustment equation of ∆i, the coefﬁcient of rm − ib is
expected to be positive.
Before the crisis, the weighted average rate of a MRO, rw, used to be only a few basis points
above the marginal rate. By contrast, after August 2007, the MRO spread, rw−rm, increased up to
30 basis points, see Figure A.1. The MRO spread can be large for two reasons. On the one hand, it
may indicate that the bulk of bids had been submitted at relatively high rates because the demand
for liquidity had been stronger than expected. Particularly in the recent ﬁnancial crisis, banks faced
a great uncertainty regarding their future liquidity situation. According to Cassola et al. (2009),
banks submitted more aggressive bids in order to make sure that they receive at least a minimum
level of liquidity. On the other hand, large MRO spreads may reveal bidders’ uncertainty about
the auction’s marginal rate, see e.g. V¨ alim¨ aki (2008). The increased heterogeneity of values for
liquidity revealed by the auction and the failure of the interbank market to lead to an efﬁcient
allocation of liquidity among banks in the course of the crisis made it very difﬁcult to forecast the
marginal rate of MRO auctions. For both reasons, a MRO auction revealing a large MRO spread
should lead to an upward pressure on the overnight rate.
The cover-to-bid ratio, CBR, of a MRO is deﬁned as the ratio between the ECB’s total al-
lotment and the banks’ total bid volume, compare Figure A.2. Large cover-to-bid ratios indicate
that banks received a lot of reﬁnancing relative to their bids. One might expect that overnight
rates should always decrease with increasing cover-to-bid ratios. However, as Linzert et al. (2007)
already emphasized, a low cover-to-bid ratio only leads to money market tensions if it resulted
from banks’ misperceptions of the marginal rate and the situation in the money market. If banks
bid seriously and the marginal rate of the MRO simply exceeded banks’ willingness to pay, a low
cover-to-bid ratio will not necessarily lead to increasing overnight rates.
6Until March 2004, banks anticipated future rate cuts of the ECB on several occasions and,
therefore, simply refrained from bidding. As a result, banks’ total bid volume was so low that
the ECB could not allot the intended volume of reserves. Due to banks’ underbidding, the cover-
to-bid ratio peaked to one but due to the lack of reserves overnight rates increased sharply at the
auction day. In order to stop the disturbing strategic bidding behavior of banks, the ECB adjusted
its operational framework in March 2004. Reducing the MRO maturity from two to one week
and synchronizing its interest rate decisions with the reserve requirement periods ensured that
auction results are not affected by banks’ expectations about future policy rates, see e.g. European
Central Bank (2003). To avoid that our results are driven by underbidding episodes, we exclude
these observations from the following regressions and allow for a different information content of
cover-to-bid ratios before and after March 2004.
The number of bidders in MROs has signiﬁcantly declined since June 2000, see Figure A.3.
Following e.g. Bindseil et al. (2009), we estimated the new information contained in the number
of bidders, i.e. the unexpected part in this variable, employing a univariate forecast equation, see
Section C in the Appendix. Note that alternative forecast and de-trending methods would not
affect our results in a signiﬁcant way. In case of a surprisingly large number of bidders which
should reveal an unexpectedly high demand for reﬁnancing, the overnight rate should increase.
Daily autonomous liquidity factors and reserve requirements drive banks’ liquidity needs.
Since June 2000, the ECB uses weekly autonomous factors forecasts to rationalize its current allot-
ment decision and to determine its benchmark allotment. If actual autonomous factors are higher
than the ECB’s benchmark allotment calculation would suggest, the liquidity situation should be
tight leading to tensions in the overnight rate, see Linzert and Schmidt (2010). Therefore, the
difference between updated forecasts and forecasted autonomous factors, ∆AF, should be in-
cluded as a control variable in the empirical analysis of the link between MROs and the money
market. While the ECB’s forecast of autonomous factors is known to the banks before the MRO
auction is conducted, the updated values are provided on the allotment day together with the MRO
auction results, between 11:15 a.m. CET and 11:20 a.m. CET. Therefore, we would expect ∆AF
to increase daily overnight rates.
74 The Response of Money Market Rates to MRO Auction
Outcomes
According to the martingale hypothesis, the overnight rate on any day corresponds to the expected
overnight rates on the following days of the same reserve maintenance period, see e.g. Bindseil
(2004a). Therefore, within the reserve maintenance period, money market rates should only react
to new information and, in particular, to the unexpected components of an auction outcome. As a
consequence, our empirical results on the relationship between the ECB’s MRO auctions and the
money market are based on the following error-correction type adjustment equation for the money
market rate,
∆it = c + α(rm − ib)t + β(rw − rm)t
+ γCCBRt + γBBt + γA∆AFt + εt, (1)
where foreach auction t, ∆it = ia,t−ib,t denotes thechange ofthe moneymarket rate immediately
after the MRO auction results have been published. α and β determine the impact of the marginal
(rm) and the weighted average MRO rate (rw) on the Eonia. Since rw − rm = (rw − ib) −
(rm − ib), equation (1) is a re-parameterization of the adjustment equation which includes both
equilibrium relationships between the auction and the money market rate, i.e. (rm−ib) and (rw−
ib). Therefore, α = 0 implies that the Eonia is disconnected from both MRO rates, since there
is neither an equilibrium relation with the marginal nor with the weighted average MRO rate. In
particular, in case of α = 0 and β  = 0, increased MRO spreads, rw − rm, may even exacerbate
the disconnection of money market rates from the policy-intended interest rate level. In case
of α  = 0 and β = 0, there is an equilibrium relation between the levels of the Eonia and the
marginal rate while the weighted average rate plays no additional role. α = β  = 0 implies that
α(rm −ib)+α(rw −rm) = α(rw −ib). In this case, the overnight rate is predominantly affected
by the weighted average MRO rate. CBR and B denote the auction’s cover to bid ratio and the
unexpected part in the number of bidders, ∆AF controls for news concerning autonomous factors.
According to Section 3, the expected signs of the coefﬁcients are γC < 0,γB > 0,γA > 0.
4.1 The Connection between the Eonia and the MRO rates before the
Financial Crisis
Table 1 shows the results obtained for the change of the Eonia in response to a MRO auction
outcome. In the pre-crisis sample, the estimates indicate a signiﬁcant and plausibly signed re-
sponse of the overnight rate to the newly announced main reﬁnancing rates. Irrespective of the
8interest rate measure, b α > 0 implies an error-correction type level relationship between the Eonia
and MRO rates. Speciﬁcally, for the daily and intra-day Eonia data, Wald tests cannot reject the
null-hypothesis that α = β. This suggests that the weighted average MRO rate, not the marginal
rate, governs the level of the overnight rate. For the one-week Eonia swap rates, the relevant in-
formation revealed by MRO rates is contained in the marginal rate. In fact, the corresponding
adjustment coefﬁcient b α = 0.8586 is very close to one. Thus, news about the marginal MRO
rate strongly inﬂuence market’s expectations about the Eonia of the following week. In line with
the central role of MROs in the transmission process of monetary policy, the evidence in favor of
an error-correction type adjustment of the Eonia conﬁrms that MRO auctions stabilized the Eonia
before the crisis.
The results obtained for the impact of the cover-to-bid ratio CBR are also in line with expec-
tations. Before the introduction of the new operational framework in 2004, results concerning the
signiﬁcance and sign of the estimated CBR coefﬁcients are mixed which reﬂects the distortions
in the CBR implied by banks’ strategic bidding behavior. After March 2004, the ECB’s reform
apparently re-established the information content of CBRs about banks’ liquidity situation. Ac-
cording to our estimates, an increase of the cover-to-bid ratio by ten percentage points decreases
the Eonia by about 0.5 basis points.
Further plausible, yet less signiﬁcant results are obtained for the number of bidders. For daily
data, we estimate that an unexpected increase of the number of bidders by 100 would decrease the
Eonia by about 3 basis points. The results obtained for ∆AF, the variable reﬂecting news about
autonomous factors, are more puzzling. Although the ECB has always been eager to estimate and
publish its forecasts on autonomous factors on a regular basis, the evidence on the information
content of this variable for the money market is rather weak.
9Table 1: The Money Market Response to a MRO Outcome
Money Market Response (∆it)
∆it = c + α(rm − ib)t + β(rw − rm)t + γCCBRt + γBBt + γA∆AFt + ǫt
Pre–Crisis: June 2000 - August 2007 Crisis: August 2007 - June 2008
Auction Variables Daily Eonia Intra Day Data 1–Week Eonia Daily Eonia Intra Day Data 1–Week Eonia
Swap Rates Swap Rates
(rm − ib) 0.5190
[0.1301]
∗∗∗ 0.2655
[0.0921]
∗∗∗ 0.8587
[0.1209]
∗∗∗ −0.0725
[0.0687]
0.0583
[0.0674]
−0.0050
[0.0795]
(rw − rm) 0.5166
[0.2354]
∗∗ 0.2953
[0.1539]
∗ 0.1467
[0.2295]
1.4565
[0.8733]
∗ 1.9740
[0.7260]
∗∗∗ 0.7891
[0.4014]
∗
Cover-to-Bid Ratio (CBR)
before March 2004 0.0922
[0.0318]
∗∗∗ −0.0287
[0.0119]
∗∗ −0.0036
[0.0221]
after March 2004 −0.0649
[0.0295]
∗∗ −0.0541
[0.0223]
∗∗ −0.0287
[0.0285]
−0.2359
[0.1227]
∗ −0.2523
[0.1379]
∗ −0.2395
[0.0600]
∗∗∗
Number of Bidders (B) 0.0003
[0.0002]
∗ 0.0001
[0.0001]
0.0000
[0.0010]
0.0012
[0.0003]
∗∗∗ 0.0005
[0.0003]
0.0034
[0.0017]
∗
Autonomous Factors (∆AF) 0.0009
[0.0004]
∗∗ 0.0002
[0.0003]
−0.0006
[0.0002]
∗∗∗ 0.0015
[0.0009]
∗ 0.0001
[0.0012]
−0.0002
[0.0007]
Obs. 282 282 282 33 33 33
R2 0.58 0.45 0.65 0.72 0.41 0.40
Wald tests of parameter equality: H0 : α = β vs H1 : α  = β
p-value 0.98 0.82 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.05
Notes: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses. The index t denotes the number
of the MROs covering the period December 2000 to June 2008.
1
04.2 The Disconnection between the Eonia and the MRO Rates during
the Financial Crisis
For the crisis period, the results for the empirical relationship between the Eonia and the MRO
rates are shown in the right panel of Table 1. They differ from those obtained for the pre-crisis
period in two important aspects. First, the estimates imply that the Eonia and the effective key
interest rates of the ECB have been disconnected. There is no signiﬁcant error-correction type
adjustment of the Eonia to the level of the MRO rates in the crisis period, i.e. α = 0. As a
consequence, MRO rates failed to stabilize the Eonia in the crisis. Second, according to the large
and signiﬁcant estimates for β the main information revealed by MRO auctions is now contained
in the spread between the MRO rates (rw − rm) and not in their levels.
During the crisis, huge MRO spreads inﬂated by safety bids stirred by banks’ uncertainty about
their reﬁnancing conditions increased the Eonia and exacerbated the disconnection of money mar-
ket rates from the policy-intended interest rate level. In sharp contrast to their stabilizing effect
before the crisis, the outcomes of MRO auctions thus contributed to de-stabilize money market
rates. In a vicious circle, a large MRO spread increased the Eonia, impaired banks’ reﬁnancing
conditions and hence created even higher MRO spreads. In view of these problems, our empir-
ical results strongly support the ECB’s decision to re-stabilize banks’ reﬁnancing conditions by
introducing a ﬁxed rate full allotment policy in its MROs as of October 2008.
Probably reﬂecting the decreasing role of the main reﬁnancing rates, the estimated adjustment
equation of the Eonia indicates a growing importance of the reﬁnancing volumes allotted in the
MRO auctions. According to the estimates, an increase in the cover-to-bid ratio CBR by 10
percentage points would lower the Eonia by roughly 2.5 basis points. Note that a stronger effect
on the Eonia can also be observed for the number of bidders.
4.3 MRO Auctions and Longer-Term Interest Rates during the Crisis
In October 2008, the ECB stopped the de-stabilizing effect of the MRO spread by switching the
MRO auction format from variable rate to ﬁxed rate tenders with full allotment. In a ﬁxed rate
tender with full allotment, all information about the MRO related reﬁnancing conditions is already
pre-announced. The new auction format ensures that the cover-to-bid ratio equals one and that
the MRO spread is zero by construction. According to our estimates for the Eonia, both measures
have contributed to improve banks’ reﬁnancing conditions.
However, the ECB took additional, even more unconventional measures to stabilize the situ-
11ation in the money market. Before the crisis, the ECB was very reluctant to give strong signals
about the policy-intended level of longer-term money market rates. As a consequence, longer-term
reﬁnancing operations (LTROs) have always been conducted as variable rate tenders without min-
imum bid rate, see Linzert et al. (2007). Since October 2008, however, the ﬁxed rate full allotment
policy has been also applied to the ECB’s longer-term reﬁnancing operations. Moreover, while
the maximum maturity of LTROs has been three month before the crisis, the ECB additionally
introduced LTROs with maturities of one, six and even twelve months. In order to shed more light
on the rationale behind these measures, we investigate whether the de-stabilizing effects of MROs
observed for the Eonia can also be found for longer-term money market rates.
To that aim, we adopt the empirical approach of the previous sections and regress the change
of longer-term Eonia swap rates at an auction day on the variables characterizing the MRO auction
outcome. The Eonia swap market is the most important derivative market segment in the euro area,
see Durr´ e (2006). The change of the Eonia swap rate at the auction day should reﬂect the impact
of the auction outcome on market’s expectations about future Eonia rates, see Taylor and Williams
(2009).
The results obtained for the swap rates are very similar to those obtained for the Eonia for
all maturities under consideration, compare Table 1 and Table 2. In particular, there is clear ev-
idence suggesting the absence of a stabilizing level relationship between the longer-term money
market rates and the MRO rates, i.e. α = 0. As expected, longer-term money market rates re-
act stronger to news about the future path of short-term rates and less to its current level. It is
more striking, however, that large MRO spreads (rw − rm) led also to signiﬁcant and presumably
policy-unintended increases of the longer-term money market rates, i.e. β > 0.
It is well-known that interest rate expectations affect the bidding behavior and, thereby, the
results of MRO auctions, see e.g. Bindseil et al. (2009). However, Table 2 shows that - vice versa
- MRO auctions can reveal information that may also affect banks’ interest rate expectations.
The signiﬁcant response of longer-term swap rates suggests that the large MRO spreads observed
until October 2008 even de-stabilized longer-term money market rates. These results provide
strong support for the ECB’s switch to the ﬁxed rate full allotment policy even in its longer-term
reﬁnancing operations.
12Table 2: The Longer-Term Money Market Response to a MRO Outcome during the Crisis
Response of longer-term money market rates (∆it)
∆it = c + α(rm − ib)t + β(rw − rm)t + γCCBRt + γBBt + γA∆AFt + ǫt
Crisis: August 2007 - June 2008
Auction Variables 1–Month Eonia 3–Month Eonia 6–Month Eonia 12–Month Eonia
Swap Rates Swap Rates Swap Rates Swap Rates
(rm − ib) −0.0050
[0.0400]
0.0582
[0.0460]
0.0570
[0.0528]
0.0425
[0.0426]
(rw − rm) 0.5848
[0.1829]
∗∗∗ 0.6537
[0.2589]
∗∗ 0.7844
[0.3213]
∗∗ 1.3251
[0.5366]
∗∗
Cover-to-Bid Ratio (CBR) −0.1341
[0.0304]
∗∗∗ −0.0868
[0.00313]
∗∗∗ −0.0669
[0.0570]
−0.1458
[0.0866]
∗
Number of Bidders (B) 0.0002
[0.0001]
∗∗ 0.0003
[0.0001]
∗∗∗ 0.0002
[0.0001]
∗ 0.0005
[0.0002]
∗∗
Autonomous Factors (∆AF) 0.0001
[0.0003]
0.0003
[0.0004]
0.0001
[0.0005]
−0.0002
[0.0008]
Obs. 33 33 33 33
R2 0.53 0.35 0.21 0.25
Notes: For further explanations, see Table 1.
1
35 Concluding Remarks
The interest rates applied in the main reﬁnancing operations (MROs) of the ECB constitute the
very beginning of the monetary transmission process in the euro area. For the implementation
of monetary policy, the connection between the main reﬁnancing rates and the short-term interest
rates in the money market is of particular importance. In line with their predominant role for
monetary policy implementation, the results of MRO auctions should have a strong and stabilizing
impact on money market conditions. This paper assessed the empirical relationship between MRO
auctions and the money market by investigating the response of money market rates to MRO
auction outcomes.
Our results show that the ﬁnancial crisis distorted the relationship between MROs and the
money market in two important ways. First, we ﬁnd that the level of money market rates has been
disconnected from MRO rates since the outbreak of the crisis in August 2007. In contrast to the
pre-crisis period, MRO auction outcomes fail to stabilize money market rates during the ﬁnancial
crisis. This implies that the ﬁrst step of the transmission channel of monetary policy has been
interrupted.
The second change in the relationship between MRO auctions and the money market concerns
the role of the MRO spread, i.e. the difference between the weighted average and the marginal
MRO rate. While MRO spreads have been typically small before the crisis, in the crisis MRO
spreads were inﬂated by safety bids reﬂecting the increased uncertainty of banks about their re-
ﬁnancing conditions. In contrast to the stabilizing impact of MRO auctions before the crisis, the
response of money market rates to the MRO spreads de-stabilized money market conditions by
exacerbating the disconnection of money market rates from the policy-intended interest rate level.
This self-enforcing destabilization is also found for longer-term money market rates. Both ﬁnd-
ings strongly support the ECB’s decision made in October 2008 to re-stabilize banks’ reﬁnancing
conditions by adopting a ﬁxed rate full allotment policy in its MROs and also in its longer-term
reﬁnancing operations (LTROs).
The ECB has repeatedly emphasized that the conduct of MROs as ’ﬁxed rate tenders with full
allotment’ can only be a temporary measure in response to the ﬁnancial crisis, see e.g. European
Central Bank (2010). How should the ECB perform its MRO auctions after the crisis? According
to the empirical auction literature the optimal choice of the auction format is not obvious. In par-
ticular, the ECB experienced that the rationing of bids in a ﬁxed rate tender without full allotment
14led to an escalating overbidding problem, i.e. banks increasingly exaggerated their bid volumes to
circumvent the rationing, see Nautz and Oechssler (2006). In June 2000, the ECB stopped banks’
overbidding by switching to a price-discriminatory variable rate tender format. Since successful
banks ’pay what they bid’, the effective reﬁnancing rate differs across banks. This paper demon-
strated that - particularly in times of market stress - large MRO spreads, deﬁned as the difference
between the weighted average and marginal MRO rate, may de-stabilize money market rates in
a signiﬁcant way. It is therefore worth noting that the price-discriminatory variable rate tender is
not the only option of the ECB. In particular, the Dutch or competitive auction format as recently
conducted by the Federal Reserve System in its term securities lending facility (TSLF) could be an
alternative to the ECB’s standard variable rate tender, see e.g. Fleming et al. (2010). In the com-
petitive auction format, the probably de-stabilizing MRO spreads are always zero because each
successful bidder pays simply the marginal rate.
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17A Figures
Figure A.1: The spread between the MRO rates (in percent)
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Notes: The MRO spread is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the weighted average
and marginal MRO rate. Since the daily dataset has been pared down to the auction
relevant days, the drawn data has not a daily frequency. The x-axis, therefore, refers
to respective auction t. The light shaded area refers to the crisis period as of August
9, 2007.
Figure A.2: The MRO’s cover-to-bid ratio
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Notes: The aggregate bid volume and total allotment are in EUR billions. The black
dashed line represents the introduction of the new operational framework as of March
2004. For further explanations, see Figure A.1.
18Figure A.3: The number of bidders in MROs
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Figure A.4: Updated forecasts minus forecasted autonomous factors around MROs (in
EUR billions)
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Notes: For further explanations, see Figure A.1 and Figure A.2
19B Structural break test
This section uses structural break tests to investigate whether the ﬁnancial crisis had a signiﬁcant
impact on the relationship between the ECB’s MRO auctions and the money market. To that
aim, the Quandt-Andrews test for unknown breakpoints is applied to the error-correction type
adjustment equation of the Eonia, compare equation (1):
∆it = c + α(rm − ib)t + β(rw − rm)t
+ γCCBRt + γBBt + γA∆AFt + εt,
We test whether there has been a break in the equation parameters c, α, β, γB, and γA for the full
sample from June 27, 2000 to October 14, 2008.6 The Quandt-Andrews test is based on standard
F-statistics, see Andrews (1993). Max F denotes the maximum of the individual F-statistics
while the Ave statistic refers to their average. Since the break point is unknown, the asymptotic
distribution of both test statistics are non standard and depend on the number of coefﬁcients that
are allowed to break and on the fraction of the sample that is examined.7 Approximate asymptotic
p-values are calculated following Hansen (1997).
Table B.1: Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test
Statistic Daily Eonia Intra Day Data
Max F (08/09/2007) 19.06
[0.0556]
17.77
[0.0878]
Ave F 11.54
[0.0047]
13.22
[0.0012]
Notes: Estimated break date and approximate asymptotic p-values in
line with Hansen (1997) in parenthesis. Test sample: June 27, 2000
to October 14, 2008 for daily Eonia and December 4, 2000 to June 17,
2008 for intra day data. Number of breaks compared: 318 and 284,
respectively.
The results conﬁrm that the role of MRO auctions for the money market has signiﬁcantly
changed since the start of the ﬁnancial crisis. For both, daily and intra-day data, the Max F
statistics chooses the ﬁrst MRO auction after the outbreak of the crisis as the main candidate for a
signiﬁcant break point.
6Note that we already accounted a structural change in the role of CBR stirred by the reform of the
ECB’s operational framework as of March 2004. Therefore, we have excluded γC from the test.
7Note that the distributions become degenerate as the ﬁrst period tested approaches the beginning of
the equation sample, or the end period approaches the end of the equation sample. To compensate for this
behavior it is generally suggested to exclude the end of the equation sample from the testing procedure.
Following Andrews (1993), we apply a symmetric ”trimming” of 5%.
20C Forecast equation of number of bidders
Following e.g. Bindseil et al. (2009) and Linzert et al. (2007), we estimate the unexpected part
in the number of bidders by regressing the number of bidders (Bt) in the current auction t on the
number of bidders in previous auctions. With respect to the changes in seasonality and maturity in
the ECB’s operational framework as of March 2004, we estimate the forecast equations for each
subperiod separately:
BOldFramework
t = 19.83
(7.7)
+ 0.39
(0.05)
Bt−1 + 0.52
(0.05)
Bt−2 (2)
− 73.98
(15.90)
DUnderbid
t + 92.45
(93.08)
DUnderbid
t−1 + 21.07
(16.17)
DUnderbid
t−2 ,
with R2 = 0.86 for the sample prior to March 2004 and
BNewFramework
t = 101.61
(27.54)
+ 0.72
(0.08)
Bt−1, (3)
with R2 = 0.52 after March 2004 until October 2008. Newey-West HAC standard errors
are reported in parentheses. DUnderbid
t is a dummy variable where DUnderbid
t = 1 captures the
underbidding episodes that occurred in auction t.8 The bi-weekly and weekly maturity of the
MROs before and after March 2004, respectively, suggests the choice of the lag structure.
8The underbidding events refer to the MROs on 13 Feb, 10 Apr, 9 Oct and 6 Nov 2001, 3 Dec and 17
Dec 2002, 3 Mar, 3 Jun and 25 Nov 2003 and 20 Feb , see Bindseil (2004b).
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